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We try to explain the function of the cerebral cortex by representing it as a large 
array of small computers, each of which applies a certain algorithm for learning to 
predict the inputs from the senses or other parts of the brain. This view ignores the 
role of the brain as a classifying device, but it puts forward its role as a learner of 
the laws of evolution of sequences of patterns. Memory is not seen here as a list of 
facts but as an operator predicting certain parameters of the future states of reality 
from its present and past states. The problem of connecting the classifying or listing 
capacity of the brain with the structures described here is still open. Q 1988 Academic 
Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The questions about how the brain thinks-that is, what kinds of 
transformations it performs, and how it learns IO think correctly-that is, to 
predict the evolution of reality or the behavior of imaginary objects-are 
open problems. We propose here a very simplified model of those activities. 
This is a development of the idea sketched in Section 5.6 of [Mz]. We view 
the flow of thoughts as a trajectory of a discrete flow @ and we hypothesize 
a concrete form of the transformation @: x(t) * x(t + 1). We also hy- 
pothesize a learning algorithm that modifies @, such that, if the brain is 
exposed first to the flow R of real events, then the flow 0 will simulate R in 
a certain sense. We connect this model with the geometry of the neocortex, 
that is, the cerebral cortex. We define also a continuous time model similar 
to the above. 
‘This paper is a Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-11140-MS November 1987. 
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We view the state of consciousness at time t as a vector x(t) = 
(xl(t)>. * * 3 am), where xi(t) is the intensity of firing of an efferent axon 
at the bottom surface of the neocortex (N denotes the number of all such 
axons). The function Q, = ((I$, . . . , a,), which depends also on the state of 
the long-term memory at time t, yields the next state of consciousness 
q(t + 1) = Oi(Xj(7) ] t - ki < r s f, j E Ni), 
where ki is a small positive integer and Ni is a small neighborhood of i (the 
set of indices corresponding to the axons of a small neighborhood of the i th 
axon). 
The feasibility of the computations of the values of Qj by an apparatus 
like the brain is guaranteed by the small sixes of the integers ki and of the 
sets Ni and a very special form of ai. In fact, each Qi will be a linear 
combination of some simple functions. The coefficients of this linear 
combination constitute a vector m, and the sequence m = (ml,. . . , mN) of 
these vectors is called here the long-term memory. We separate the thinking 
mode of operation of our model, which is given by the above equation from 
its learning mode, by postulating that in the latter the long-term memory 
changes with time. In fact the discussion of these changes of m constitute 
the main theme of this paper. They will be given by an algorithm which 
again is sufficiently simple to be executed very fast in the neocortex. 
Because our model is still quite abstract, we shall not use (nor are we able 
to use) more than the most rudimentary information about the anatomy 
and physiology of the brain. The reader who would like more information 
about the latter may consult [E, NF, T] and references therein. 
The first mathematical learning algorithms for coefficients of linear forms 
were invented around 1960 by F. Rosenblatt and by Widrow and Hoff (see 
[B, L, S, WS] and references therein). Related algorithms, some of them 
with continuous variables, followed (see [B, DH, L, M,, M,, M,, MP, S, 
WS] and references therein). One of those, a refined version with continu- 
ous variables but discrete time introduced in Section 5 of [MJ, will be 
recalled and applied here in Section 2. (See also Remark 2 in Section 5 of 
this paper.) Another will be given in Section 4. 
The original hopes of many authors concerning the importance of leam- 
ing algorithms of the above kind have not been fulfilled. One of the 
difficulties has been the following. Perceptrons with Q-functions having few 
arguments were applied to large retinas and it was discovered (see [MP]) 
that they are unable to recognize certain natural properties of patterns 
(connectedness, parity, etc.). 
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Our attempt uses the time variable in a more essential way so that it is 
not affected by the above obstacle. For the reader familiar with perceptrons 
and cellular automata we can outline it as follows. We imagine again a large 
“retina” (the bottom surface of the neocortex) and a sequence of patterns 
appearing on it. We assume that those patterns evolve according to local 
laws that are similar to the laws of change of the patterns on a tape of a 
two-dimensional cellular automaton. For each cell of this “retina,” we 
construct a little perceptron-like machine whose retina consists of a small 
neighborhood Ni of i at a few time steps T, as in the above equation. Then 
we let this system learn to predict the evolving sequence of patterns. We 
conjecture that the neocortex is, or at least contains, a machine of that kind. 
This model will be defined below in a detailed way, and this paper is 
self-contained except for the proof of Theorem 2.2.1, which is given in [M2] 
(see also [MJ). 
No computer simulation is necessary to establish that our model can 
really learn to predict appropriate flows (since our theorems will prove it). 
On the other hand, we do not see how to establish that the flow of sensory 
inputs to the neocortex can be learned in this way (to the extent that 
eventually our model could produce intelligent flows of thoughts). This gap 
will be partly filled in Section 3 where we shall prove that the model can 
learn to simulate the action of some interesting two-dimensional cellular 
automata. 
If the reader feels that our model is too speculative, we request his 
tolerance until a better one is found. We should remark here that it is rather 
the functioning of the brain than its structure that we wish to approximate. 
Although the literature on this subject is voluminous, we have not found 
any alternatives that bring us closer to our goal. If we have overlooked 
some other models, which like ours are supported by a concrete learning 
theory, we shall be very indebted to the reader for references. 
We shall present the discrete time model in Section 2 and the continuous 
time model in Section 4. In Section 5 we collect a few remarks about the 
discrepancy and agreement between our model and the reality and we 
discuss some other ideas and problems. The roles of the authors of this 
paper is told at the end. 
2. THE MODEL WITH DISCRETE TIME 
In this section, we define a model of the neocortex assuming that the 
computations that it performs are based on a discrete time variable t. (The 
(Y rhythm of the brain could measure the time steps.) In Section 4, we will 
present a related model with a continuous time. For the rest of this section, 
t = 0, 1,2, . . . . 
468 MYCIELSKI AND SWIERCZKOWSKI 
2.1. Thought as a Dynamic Process 
The neocortex is a layered cover (about 5 mm thick) of the inner brain 
packed in a folded way under the skull. Its inner surface is reached by a 
huge number of axons that bring their information (in the form of rates of 
firing) from the senses (often via relay neurons) or from other parts of the 
central nervous system such as the cerebellum, the brainstem, the thalamus, 
the hypothalamus, the amygdala, the corpus striatum, etc. (see [NF]). Those 
axons are called aBrent. We assume that each afferent axon Ai (i = 
1 ,-**, N, where N is very large, say N = 109) has a companion efirent 
axon E, directed in the opposite sense, which brings some information 
computed in the neocortex to the place where Ai enters the neocortex. 
We picture the neocortex conceptually as a set of thin overlapping 
columns Ci perpendicular to the cortical layers, such that most of the 
computation of the output of Ei from one time step to the next takes place 
within Ci. Let Nj be the set of all j’s such that Aj reaches C,. 
The input brought by Ai at time t is denoted xi(t) and the output of Ei 
at time t is denoted n(t). We define also 
x0) = (xl(t), .. ., x&)) 
and 
YW = (n(t), . . . T YAM). 
The vector x(t) is called the input and the vector y(t) is called the state of 
imagination at time t. It will be convenient to assume that x(t) and y(t) 
exist also for all integers t < 0. 
Each Cj contains a calculating device that can compute yi(t + 1) in two 
possible modes. 
I. The learning mode. In this mode, 
yi(t + 1) = 4(mi(t), xi(~) 1 j E N,, t - k,.< 7 I t) 
and 
mi(t + 1) = Mi(mi(t), xi(t + l), ~~(7) 1 j E Ni, t - ki < 7 I t) 
for t 2 k,. Here mi(t) is a vector in Wdl, called the long-term memory of Ci, 
and ki and di are some small integer constants. More details about the 
structure of the functions Fi and Mi will follow. 
II. The thinking mode. In this mode, 
yi(t + 1) = &(mi(t), y,(7) lj E h$, t - ki < 7 2 t) 
A MODEL OF THE NEOCORTEX 469 
and 
q(t + 1) = m&) 
for t 2 t,. Thus, if all Ci (i = 1,. . . , IV) are in the thinking mode, then 
the state of imagination r(t) is a trajectory of a dynamic system deter- 
mined by the function F = (F,, . . . , FN), the initial memory m( to) = 
(m,(4)), . *. 9 m,(t,)), and the initial input (xi(r)lt,, - ki < r I t,, i = 
1 ,---, N); and, as long as the whole system C, (i = 1,. . . , N) remains in 
the thinking mode, we have m(t) = m(to). 
Now we define the functions E; and Mi. We assume that C, has a 
subsystem that computes a preparatory map 
tJJi: 88’1 --) IR d,- {O}, 
where ci = IIVJk, is the number of arguments xj(r) (j E Ni, t - k, < r 2 
t) upon which l$ depends and di is as above. Letting #i = (qi,r,. . . , #id,), 
we assume that the Jli, are some simple linearly independent functions. For 
example, \clir could be a monomial, that is, a product of some of the values 
xi( 7) (the constant monomial 1 is allowed) or a threshold function of the 
form max(x, c) or min(x, c), or the characteristic function of an interval, or 
some simple composition of such functions. We let 
G,(t) = 3ji,(xj(7) 1 j E 4, t - k, < 7 5 1). 
Thus e.g., if qi, is a monomial, then &,(t) is just the product of some of the 
numbers xi(r). Finally, we have the following formulas for Fi and Mi: 
~(mi(f), Xi(‘) lj E Ni, t - ‘i < 7 ~ t) = (mi(t),~i(t)) 
= r$lmir(t)+i.jf)7 
Mi(mi(t), Xi(f + l), Xj(7) I j E i$, t - k, < 7 2 t) 
= mi(t) + ei(t) 1 - - [ 1 +itt) le,?) I + Il+i(t) II ’ - 
where [xl, = max(0, x), ll~ll is the Euclidean norm of Y and 
Let us explain the intended meaning of the above quantities: 
Cmitt)9 +iCt)) = .YiCt + l)Y which is computed by Ci at time t, is an 
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estimate or prediction of xi(t + l), and ei(l) is the relative error of this 
prediction. (As we shall see in the next section, the system is designed in 
such a way as to minimize 1 e,( 1) 1 in a certain sense.) The above definition 
of mi(t + l), the memory of Ci, is such that m,(t + 1) minimizes the 
Euclidean norm 
Imitt + ‘1 - mi(t) II 
while satisfying the inequality 
14 + 1) - (4 + 119 cp,(t)> I ~@, 
II@iCt) II I’ 
(It is easy to check that these properties constitute an alternative definition 
of m,(t + 1) in the learning mode.) Finally, Oi, a nonnegative constant, is 
the threshold of tolerated errors; indeed, the above formulas imply that 
mi(t + 1) = mi(t) unless jei(t)l > Oi; in fact IlrnJt + 1) - mi(t)ll = 
[lei(t>l - Oil+. 
Now the reader may wish to look again at the formulas defining vi( t + 1) 
and m,(t + 1) and check that in the thinking mode yi(t + 1) is a function 
of mi(to) and yi( 7) (j E Ni, t - ki < 7 5 t), while in the learning mode, 
m,(t + 1) is a function of mi(t), xi(t + 1) and ~~(7) (j E Ni, t - ki < 7 I 
t>* 
Thus our model is completely defined except for the constants N, ki, d,, 
the functions $ir, and the neighborhoods Ni. Of course, those blanks must 
be filled somehow as they will be in the two examples in Section 3. 
We conjecture that different layers of the neocortex compute different 
functions $ir, while neighboring neurons in the same layer compute similar 
functions #+ 
2.2. The Learning Theorem 
We define, for any m E Wdg, 
E,(t m) = Xi(t + ‘1 - (mi~+i<t>> 
, 9 Il+iCt> II . 
In this section, we deal with a single column Ci and so, to simplify the 
notation, we will omit the index i. Thus d = di, m = mi, e(t) = e,(t), 
E = q, etc. We put 
E,(m) = Sup le(t, m) I, 
tzs 
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and, for any real (r, 
s, = fi (Mt)l - @l+Y 
t=O 
= f Ilm(t + 1) - m(t) ]la. 
t=o 
Note that e(t) = ~(t, m(t)). 
We shall say that the model learns if S, < co. 
2.2.1. THEOREM. If the system operates in the learning mode, then 
(9 Ilm(t + 1) - m(t)11 = [IWl - @I+, 
(ii) S, I min{]]m - m(0)]12 ] m E Rd, E,(m) I O}, and 
(iii) S, I Inf{(]]m - m(0)l12 - S,)/(2(0 - E,(m))) ( m E Wd, E,(m) 
c O}. 
The equality (i) follows directly from the definition of m( t + 1) and the 
inequalities (ii) and (iii) have been proved in Section 5 of [M2]. We have 
used the convention min 0 = Inf 0 = cc. (A generalization of this theo- 
rem is proved in [MJ). 
2.2.2. COROLLARY. Zf there exists an s such that Inf{E,(m)]m E Wd} 
I@[<@], thenS,<oo[S,<co]. 
Thus, in particular, if Je(t, m)l I O* for some O* 2 0, m E Rd and for 
all t, then the model learns for every 0 > O*. 
This corollary follows from parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.2.1 and from 
the remark that for every s there exists an m, E Rd, such that 
E,(m,) = Inf{ E,(m) I m E W”}. 
Of course Es(m,) decreases with s. Let 
6 = lim E,(m,). 
s+m 
2.2.3. COROLLARY. Zf 0 > 6 then S, < cc and lim,,,m(t) exists. 
This follows from parts (iii) and (i) of Theorem 2.2.1. 
The above theorem and corollaries show in what sense our model learns 
to minimize the errors ]e( t)l, if 8 is large enough. Let us add a few more 
facts that may clarify the functioning of this model. 
2.2.4. PROPOSITION. If for some 0 and some m(0) we have lim, -mm(t) 
= fi, then 
6 I slwEJ(fi) I limsup]e(t)( I 0. 
1’00 
472 MYCIELSKI AND SWIERCZKOWSKI 
Proof: The first inequality follows from an alternative definition of 0, 
namely, 
Since 
lim SupIe(t,fi)] = limsup(E(t,*)( 
s-+m tts t+m 
is a general fact, and e(t) = ~(f, m(r)), the second inequality is equivalent 
to 
limSupI&(t,tE)( 5 limsup~E(f,m(t)~. 
1-m r+m 
This in turn follows from 
0 I lim le(t, 52) - ~(t, m(f))) = h (6 - m(t), +(f)ll+(t) II-‘) 
r-m r-+m 
I lim pl - m(t)ll = 0. 
t--*00 
Finally, from part (i) of the theorem, we have 
0 5 )&: [le(t)l - 0]+= ttt Ilm(t + 1) - m(t)11 = 0. 
This proves the last inequality. 
2.2.5. PROPOSITION. 
0 = Inf(0I V m(0) [S, < cc]} 
= Inf { 0 1 V m (0) [the sequence m(t) converges] } 
= Inf(01 3 m(O)[Si < co]} 
= Inf { 0 1 3 m (0) [the sequence m (2) converges] } . 
Proof: Let O,, 0,, 0,, 0, be the right-hand sides of the above equali- 
ties. We have to show that 0, = 0, = 0, = 04 = 0. 
From Theorem 2.2.1 parts (i) and (ii), it follows that if for some 0 and 
m(0) we have S, < 00, then for every m(0) the sequence m(t) created by 
the learning algorithm for this 0 will converge. This implies 
0, I 0, and 0, I 0,. 
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More evident are the inequalities 0, < 0, and 0, I 0,. Summarizing, we 
have 
thus, it will suffice to show that 0, I 0, and 0, = 0. 
Let E > 0 be arbitrary. Thus there exists a 0 < 0, + E such that the 
corresponding sequence m(t) converges. Let lim, _ &t) = fi. Choose any 
0’ > 0. Then Proposition 2.2.4 implies that E,(k) -C 0’ for some s. 
Corollary 2.2.2 implies now that S, < cc for the series S, corresponding to 
0’. Hence, 0, I 0’. Thus we have for every E > 0 a 0, such that 0, < 0 
c 0, + E and for arbitrary 0’: 
0 < 0’ =a 0, 5 0’. 
This implies 0, I 0,. 
Let us show that 0 = 0,. For arbitrary E > 0, we can choose a 0 such 
that 0, 5 0 < 0, + E, and there is an m(0) such that the sequence m(t) 
corresponding to 0 converges, say to k Then, by Proposition 2.2.4, 
lim .,,E,(fi) < 0, whence 6 I 0 Since E > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain 
6 I 0,. The inequality 0, I 0 follows from Corollary 2. 
2.2.6. PROPOSITION. (i) Zf d = 1 and 0 = 0, then every sequence m(t) 
converges. 
(ii) For d 2 2 and 0 = 6 the sequence m(t) may diverge, even in the 
case where 0 = 6 = E,(m) = 0 for some m. 
We omit the proof, which is not difficult. 
3. REPRESENTABILITY 
We have shown in the previous section that if x(O), x(l), . . . , is the 
trajectory of a dynamic system such that there exists a memory m = 
Cm 1,. . ., mN), mi E oZdl, such that for all i and t, Jq(t, mi)l I Oi*, then 
for every m(0) and every thresholds Oi > Oi* the model learns. The 
existenceofanmsatisfyingIei(t,mi)l ~O~*fori=l,...,Nandforallt 
will be called (O:, . . . , 0$)-representability of the trajectory x(O), x(l), . . . . 
So every representable trajectory can be learned by our model. Let 
(0, . . . , O)-representability be called exact representability. It will be interest- 
ing to see that some known dynamic systems have representable or even 
exactly representable trajectories. 
474 MYCIELSKI AND SWIERCZKOWSKI 
3.1. Representability of a Vibrating Membrane 
Recall the equation of a vibrating membrane over a bounded domain 
D G R 2 with boundary 852 
azx azx a2x -= 
at2 @+as,2’ b1, 4 E Q2, t 2 0, 
with the usual boundary and initial conditions 
x(s1, s2, t) = 0, for (pi, s2) E as+ 
x(+7 s2,o) = fh,, s2h 
and 
where fi and f2 are sufficiently regular functions vanishing over aP. 
It is well known, see, e.g., [RM], how to get a discrete counterpart of this 
system, that is, a dynamic system with discrete time and space whose 
trajectories, with appropriate unit of time and initial conditions x( *, *, 0) 
and x(., *, l), approximate those of the above problem. Roughly speaking, 
the original differential equation is replaced by a linear difference equation 
of the form 
X(Sl, s2, t + 1) = FSl&(Ul’ a,, T) 1 la, - sil I 1, 7 = t, t - l), 
where the units of distance and time are chosen such that the variables si, 
s2, and t take on integer values. Moreover, the coefficients of the linear 
form FS,S, depend only on (si, s2). 
Let i run over the pairs (si, sz). Thus we see that the coefficients of the 
forms 4 constitute memory vectors m, as required in the condition of 
representability. We conclude that the vibrating membrane is a dynamic 
system that can be learned by our model so that predictions made in the 
learning mode for the near future will be fairly accurate. 
3.2. Representability of Two-Dimensional Cellular Automata 
Just as above, we can see that every cellular automaton over a finite 
two-dimensional tape is exactly representable and hence it also can be 
learned. Indeed, cellular automata are dynamic systems of the form 
Xi(t + 1) = e(Xj(t) 1 j E Ni), 
where the variables x,(t) run over a finite alphabet 2. If the letters of Z are 
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represented by distinct real numbers, then I;; can be represented by 
polynomials. The coefficient of those polynomials form vectors m, as 
required in the condition of exact representability (since here we can even 
assume that Oi* = 0). 
If we wanted a machine especially designed to learn such systems, we 
could also apply the original learning procedures of Rosenblatt’s per- 
ceptrons (see [M,] Section 6 for a slightly refined version). 
The popular cellular automaton “Life” of J. H. Conway is an interesting 
example. Here Z = (0, l}, i runs over the points (sl, s2) of the integral 
lattice, and N,,s, = {(a,, a*)] ]uk - sk] I l}, thus ]Nslsz] = 9, while Fi is a 
special polynomial in the variables xj(t), j E N,. Namely, &(x,(t)]j E N,) 
= 1 if xi(t) = 1 and 3 I Z ,cN,~j(f) I 4, or, if xi(t) = 0 and Zj,.xj(t) 
= 3. Otherwise, 4(x,(t)]j E Ni) = 0. It is easy to modify this definition so 
that it will apply to some finite part of the integral lattice. As Conway et al. 
have shown in [BCG], “Life” can represent in a certain sense a universal 
Turing machine. Hence, we may conclude that an appropriate version of 
our model can learn to think in a very sophisticated way. Unfortunately, 
the theorem of Conway et al. requires an artificial coding of numbers and 
programs by means of patterns on the two-dimensional lattice, and a huge 
amount of space and time is needed to simulate even the most elementary 
operations. It would be interesting to see if it is possible to remove those 
undesirable features of Conway’s representation of universal machines, 
using a larger alphabet. (He suggested this problem in a lecture at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in 1985.) 
4. THE MODEL WITH CONTINUOUS TIME 
In this section, we shall define a variant of the previous learning al- 
gorithm, where the time variable t runs over the continuum [0, cc). We 
assume that the reader is familiar with Section 2 and we shall omit the 
interpretations and confine our exposition to the learning theorems. We 
develop an algorithm for any time step h > 0. Thus, here t = 0, h, 2h,. . . , 
and h is variable. 
We assume that 
cp: W++ Wd- (0) and x: W++ W. 
Givenv,h>0,0>0,andm(0)EWd,wedefinefort=0,h,2h ,..., 
E(rn, t) = x0 + h) - hi) 
IM> II 
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and 
m(t + h) = m(t) + s~(e(t))vh~(t)/ll~(i) II, if /e(t) I> 0, 
= m(t), if [e(r) ( I Q, 
where e(t) = E( m( t), t ). Here v is called the speed of learning, and h the 
time step. We will denote m(0) by m,,. 
4.1. THEOREM. If rn E Wd satisfie le(m, t)l I 8 for t = 0, h,2h ,..., 
then for all T 
h c [k(t)1 - Ql+ s ?f;llm - ol12 + tfiv, 
t<T 
where t runs over 0, h, 2h, . . . , . 
Remark. In vague but suggestive terms, for very small h, the above 
theorem can be expressed in the form: 
Zf le(m, t)l I 8 for all t E R+ then 
/um[le(~)l - @I+ dt s $llm - m,ll*. 
Proof of 4.1. We set s, = llrn - m(t)ll* and +y = +(t)/ll+(t)ll. Then, if 
IWI > 0, 
St+h = ll(m - m(t)) - sgn(e(t))vW~1(2 
= s, - 2(m - m(t),sgn(e(t))vh&) + v*h* 
= s, - 2le(t) Ivh + 2sgn(e(t))vhE(m, t) + v*h* 
I s, - 2/e(t) (vh + 2vh0 + v*h*. 
Hence, if I runs over the subsequence of 0, h,2h,. . . , for which le(r)l > 8, 
we have 




- 8 - T . 
i 
This implies the theorem. 
4.2. THEOREM. If Sup,,,, h,2h,. le(m, t)l = 8, and 0 - 0, > vh/2, 
then 
F[lm(t+h)-m(t)/< “m-mo112 
2(8 - Qo) - vh ’ 
where t runs over 0, h, 2h,. . . , . 
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Remark. Again, using imprecise but suggestive terms: Ifls(m, t)l 5 8, 
foraltER+ ~nd0~8~,theflthelengthofthecumem(t)(tER+)does 
not exceed the value 
Ilm - ~ol12 
2(@ - 63,) * 
Proof of 4.2. In the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we get for 
all 2-X 03, 
0 I so - 2vh c (le(t)l - 9, - vh/2), 
t<T 
where again c runs only over those terms of the sequence 0, h, 2h,. . . , for 
which le(t)l > 8. Let NT = I{tl le(t)l > 8, t <, T}I. The above in- 
equality implies 
0 I so - ZvhN,(@ - eo) + NTv2h2 
for all T. Hence, 
TbmNT 5 
lb - mol12 
2vh(8 - 63,) - v*h*’ 
Since, for all t for which le(t)l > 8 we have ljm(t + h) - m(t)11 = vh and 
for all other t we have m(t + h) = m(t), the theorem follows. 
5. MISCELLANEOUSREMARKS 
1. We wish to stress again that our model could be an extremely 
simplified picture of reality at best. In fact, we drew only upon two facts: 
(a) the activity of the neocortex is local in such a way that it suggests our 
independent computing units Ci, and (b) the only quantitative learning 
theorems based upon simple enough computations are those that we have 
used above. Thus, we saw no other natural alternatives for our learning 
units Ci. On the other hand, the computations that go on in the neocortex 
are not known, and we can only conjecture that they are similar to those of 
our algorithms. 
2. The linear predictor y,(t + 1) = (q(t), xi(t)) which we have con- 
sidered in this paper could be replaced by any other function 
Yi(t + l) = pi(mi(t)9 xi(t))e 
Then our simple formula for mi(t + 1) (in the learning mode) could be 
replaced by 
"i(t + l) = mi(r) + a(xi(r + l) - P~(m~(t)~xi(f)))(VPi/l~VP~~~2)~ 
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where (II is some small enough positive constant and vPi is the gradient 
vector of partial derivatives of Pi relative to the components of mi evaluated 
at the point (mj(t),x,(t)). 
We have not used this generalization in the main body of the paper 
because we do not know any good extension of Theorem 2.2.1 for this 
situation. As long as our model is purely theoretical, it better be founded on 
a concrete learning theorem. But notice that in our model the inputs xi(t) 
reaching the neocortex are prepared by other systems and, in general, are 
nonlinear functions of the intensities communicated by the sensory neu- 
rons. 
3. There are many differences between the real brain and our model. 
For example, real thinking and learning go on simultaneously, but we have 
assigned to them disjoint time intervals. Also, our bijection between the 
afferent and efferent axons is only a simplification. 
4. What is the role of the cerebellum and its collaboration with the 
neocortex? Our model does not make any distinctions between those inputs 
of the neocortex that come from the senses and those that come from other 
systems of the brain. 
5. A technical idea that we have not incorporated into our model is the 
sharpening of contours of patterns that result from the lateral inhibition in 
the spinal cord and in the visual system. This idea is used in some picture 
processing algorithms (see [E, DH, H, RK]), and it could be of some 
importance to our future understanding of the brain. 
6. The neocortex receives its inputs from various places: (a) from the 
senses, (b) from many systems in the old brain, and (c) from itself via 
fasciculi of fibers joining more distant portions of the neocortex to each 
other (see [NF, Chaps. 13 and 161). The inputs of type (c) have not been 
considered in our model. Can they be explained by the need to correlate 
information arriving from different senses (for example, certain sounds 
ought to be correlated with certain images)? If so, the connections of type 
(c) would not transcend our model in an essential way; they would be only 
a sophisticated system of distribution of the input. It is also conceivable 
that the units Ci of our model are not localized in single columns of the 
neocortex but occupy two or more sites in the brain. Again this would 
necessitate only an inessential modification of the model. 
7. In this paper, we presented our thesis that memory is described best 
if we view it as a transformation defining a dynamic system. This view 
should be complemented with another one: memory is a store of patterns or 
impressions such that, given a new pattern, the nearest one in this store can 
be readily found. Perhaps this latter view is important but at present we do 
not know any model relating it to the structure of the brain. Computer 
science has developed interesting methods for lexicographic or context 
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addressable storage that could be important for the development of such 
models, see [EM], Section 7 in [M,], and references therein. (But recogni- 
tion or classification of certain segments of the flow of inputs could also be 
achieved in simple extensions of our model; for example, as suggested by 
Section 3.1, one could add a subroutine for the learning mode that signals 
long stretches of unusually small errors in the learning mode. Such stretches 
indicate that efficient learning has occurred for such segments of the flow, 
even though accurate long-term prediction could be still impossible (or 
unnecessary) for them. For example, our recognition of various types of 
undulating or shimmering surfaces or quick movements could be based on 
such mechanisms. 
8. It is clear that our model can approximate dynamical systems with 
continuous time having all kinds of instabilities, that is, discontinuous 
dependence of trajectories upon initial conditions or bifurcation of integral 
curves. Those phenomena are similar to the free choice apparent in theJIow of 
human thoughts and decisions. 
9. We recall that learning theorems reduce the problem of explaining 
learning and thinking to the problem of representability of appropriate 
transformations. However, only some examples were given in Section 3, and 
no useful theorem about representability has been established. It is clear 
that the transformations representable in our sense constitute a linear 
space. What are the functions #il which are computable easily enough and 
which secure that this space is wide enough to contain transformations 
capable of generating intelligent streams of thought? 
10. Our model is predicated upon the following postulate or conjec- 
ture: There exists a map \k of the sensory input into the thinking machinery 
(\k is determined by the neural fibers and subsystems uch as the cerebel- 
lum and it is not modified in any essential way by the process of learning) 
such that the motion of the image produced by \k which is caused by the 
changes of the input is governed often enough by suficiently local and 
s@ciently simple laws. Our model reduces the problem of explaining 
intelligence to the problem of the existence of such a map \k and of the 
underlying sufficiently local and simple laws. However, we think that there 
are some additional important mechanisms, mentioned above in Remark 7, 
which are not present in our model and require new ideas. 
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